



Keep Concrete Weird

UNUSUAL PROJECTS



2025 SPRING CONVENTION

AUSTIN, TEXAS • APRIL 13 – 16, 2025

A Seemingly Improbable Crisis:
The Perfect Storm at Oroville Dam

Presented by:
Jeremy Begley, PE
MAPEI Corporation

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INTRODUCTION

February 2017

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CONVENTION
APRIL 13- 16, 2025




INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION



For want of a nail,
the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe,
the horse was lost.
For want of a horse,
the battle was lost.
- Unknown

https://www.sparkpeople.com/resource/quotes_translation.asp?id=286



Live Content Slide


When playing as a slideshow, this slide will display live content

**Poll: How familiar are you with the Oroville Dam
Spillway Incident of 2017?**

BACKGROUND


- **Location:** Oroville, CA (Feather River)
- **Construction Period:** 1961– 1968 (7 years)
- **Opened:** May 4, 1968
- **Owner:** California Department of Water Resources (DWR)
- **Engineer:** California Department of Water Resources (DWR)
- **Height:** 770 feet (235 meters) – **Tallest dam in the U.S.**
- **Length:** 6,920 feet (2,109 meters)
- **Type:** Earthfill embankment dam (clay core)
- **Reservoir Capacity:** 3.5 million acre-feet (Lake Oroville)
- **Primary Purposes:**
 - Water supply: part of the California State Water Project (SWP)
 - Flood control
 - Hydropower generation
 - Recreation
 - Fish & wildlife protection
- **Main Spillway:** 3,000 feet (914 meters) long, 179 ft wide, RC chute
- **Emergency Spillway:** Concrete weir & unlined hillside (first use in 2017)
- **Power Generation:** Edward Hyatt Powerplant (645 MW capacity)

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BACKGROUND

- **Oroville Dam Complex**
 - Dam & Reservoir
 - Forebay & Afterbay
 - Power Plants & Pumping Plants
 - Fish Hatchery



- **Overview of Oroville Dam Facility**

- Prior to Feb 2017 Incident
- Unlined emergency spillway

BACKGROUND




BACKGROUND

- **Overview of Oroville Dam Facility**
 - Prior to Feb 2017 Incident
 - Unlined emergency spillway




PRELUDE TO CRISIS


- Heavy Rain in the Sierras
 - Above-normal precipitation after years of drought
- Feather River Basin
 - Almost 13" (330 mm) between Feb. 6-10
 - Over 50 ft reservoir rise in 6 days



As of Feb. 12, 2017.




<https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-oroville-flooding/>



https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6c/Oroville_Lake_Elevation_Feb_2017.png

PRELUDE TO CRISIS

- Flood Control
- Design for Flood Control Outlet (FCO)
 - 440,000 cfs inflow
- Larger Historical Flood Events:
 - 1997 event (largest)
 - 300,000+ cfs inflow





-
- <https://damsafety.org/sites/default/files/111617mainreportc205arctic%20year%20reportc205final%2005-18.pdf>



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THE SITUATION ROOM

- **Incident Trigger :**
 - Chute slab failure and erosion
 - Closure of service spillway gates for damage assessment.
- **Risk Tradeoffs:**
 - Difficult choices
- **Key Dilemma:**
 - Further spillway damage
 - Potential damage to transmission tower
 - Debris buildup causing potential powerhouse flooding
 - Overtopping emergency spillway weir
 - Possible erosion
- **Strategic Response:**
 - “Sweet spot”
 - Controlled use of the service spillway with minimal discharges
 - Goal: prevent overtopping the emergency spillway weir
 - All hands on-deck to make the call



ESCALATION OF INCIDENT

- **Tradeoffs & Decision Points**

- Discharge limited
- Best intentions

- **Risk Assessment**

- Lower powerhouse flood risk
- Limited discharge continuation
- Rain keeps pouring



ESCALATION OF INCIDENT

- **Outcome**

- Flow over emergency spillway weir
- Sweet spot not achieved

MISSION FAILED

Murphy's Laws

1. In any field of endeavor, anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.
2. Left to themselves, things always go from bad to worse.
3. If there is a possibility of several things going wrong, the one that will go wrong, is the one that will cause the most damage.
4. Nature always sides with the hidden flaw.
5. If everything seems to be going well, you have obviously overlooked something.

<https://www.eit.edu.au/the-truth-behind-murphys-law/>

EMERGENCY SPILLWAY ISSUES

- **Activation of Emergency Spillway**
 - Untested
 - First-ever use of the emergency spillway
 - February 11, 2017
- **Erosion of Unlined Emergency Spillway**
 - More severe and rapid than expected
 - Geology assumed to be competent
- **Weir Stability Concerns**
 - Headcutting
 - Undermining of toe




FAILURE MODES

- What is a Potential Failure Mode (PFM)?
- Use of PFMs
 - Risk Identification
 - How structure can potentially fail (e.g., overtopping)
 - Design & Rehabilitation Guidance
 - Emergency Planning
 - Monitoring & Inspections
 - Training & Communication
 - Prioritization
 - Determine issues with greatest risk and address first

Water pours over a concrete wall that forms an emergency spillway when the lake overflows.

The water erodes the earth, forming a hole.

If the hole reaches the lake, the wall could collapse.




Source: DWR. Graphics reporting by Rong-Gong Lin II, Chris Megerian
<https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-oroville-flooding/>

DAM OVERTOPPING

- ❖ Hydrologic event (flood) occurs.
- ❖ Inflows into the reservoir are greater than the outflow capacity causing an increase in the reservoir level.
- ❖ Higher reservoir level overtops crest of weir and overtopping jet impacts downstream foundation rock.
- ❖ Stream power from overtopping jet is greater than erodibility index of the rock, resulting in scour.
- ❖ Rock scour progresses beneath the weir, resulting in reduced sliding or overturning capacity.
- ❖ Driving force is greater than the capacity, and results in instability and uncontrolled release of the reservoir.

INITIATING EVENT



PROGRESSION




FAILURE

EVACUATION MEASURES





- **February 12: 3:44 PM**
 - Evacuation Order
 - Risks too great
 - Safety of lives downstream
 - 188,000 people evacuated
- **Feb 12: 7:00 PM**
 - FCO discharge increased to 100,000cfs
 - Maintained until Feb 16, 8:00 AM
- **Feb 14: 3:30 PM**
 - Downgrade to evacuation warning
- **Reservoir Management:**
 - Target level El. 850, 50 feet below full pool
 - Feb 20, 3:00 PM: Target reached and maintained
 - Feb 16–27: Discharges adjusted (80,000–50,000 cfs)
- **Feb 27: 7:00 AM**
 - Spillway gate closure began
 - Fully closed by 1:00 PM—investigations initiated



IMMEDIATE MITIGATION EFFORTS

- **Reduce reservoir levels to stop emergency spillway overflows**
 - FCO discharge increased to 100,000cfs
- **Emergency Repairs**
 - Boulders and concrete to fill voids



TIMELINE OF CRISIS

7 Feb 2017: Main spillway fails

Craters appear in the main spillway. To avoid increasing the damage to the spillway, water releases are slowed allowing the lake to rise.



11 Feb 2017: Emergency spillway used

Water flows over the emergency spillway causing erosion and damage. This is by design and prevents water going over the top of the main dam. However the ground erodes faster than expected.



13 Feb 2017: Repairs made

Rocks and concrete (1) are placed under the emergency spillway weir to repair erosion damage (2). The release of water into the main spillway is increased, to lower the lake in preparation for more rain. This erodes the adjacent hillside considerably, generating a debris dam (3) that blocks the river and forces the closure of the hydroelectric plant.



Potential risks

While the main 770 ft (230 m) dam is not threatened, if the erosion on *either* spillway reaches the top, it would cause the weir or gate (respectively) to collapse, causing a large uncontrolled water release and life-threatening floods.



[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oroville_Dam_crisis#:~:text=Between%20February%206%E2%80%9310%2C%202017,%2Fs\)%20the%20following%20day.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oroville_Dam_crisis#:~:text=Between%20February%206%E2%80%9310%2C%202017,%2Fs)%20the%20following%20day.)

AFTERMATH

- Assessing the damage



FORENSIC INVESTIGATION

- Independent Forensic Investigation
- Formation of Independent Forensic Team (IFT)
- Purpose and Objectives of IFT
- Findings and conclusions

To complete a thorough review of available information to develop findings and opinions on the chain of conditions, actions, and inactions that caused the damage to the service spillway and emergency spillway, and why opportunities for intervention in the chain of conditions, actions, or inactions may not have been realized. Evaluations of actions, inactions, and decisions for the various stages of the project (pre-design, design, construction, operations, and maintenance) will consider the states of practice applicable to the various time periods involved.

John W. France, PE, D.GE, D.WRE – Team Leader and Geotechnical Engineer


Irfan A. Alvi, PE – Hydraulic Structures Engineer and Human Factors Specialist

Peter A. Dickson, PhD, PG – Engineering Geologist

Henry T. Falvey, Dr.-Ing, Hon.D.WRE – Hydraulic Engineer

Stephen J. Rigbey – Director, Dam Safety at BC Hydro, and Geological Engineer

John Trojanowski, PE – Hydraulic Structures Engineer



PHYSICAL FACTORS

- **Poor foundation and geologic conditions**
 - Erodible material and fractured rock
- **Design and as-constructed vulnerabilities**
 - Thin concrete slab
 - Drainage system issues
 - Blocked or poorly functioning
 - Anchor capacity reduction
 - Lack of proper anchorage in sound rock
 - Expansion of shallow void under slab
 - Erosion or clay shrinkage
 - Corrosion of steel reinforcement and dowels across cracks/joints
 - Ineffective repairs and progressive deterioration






Photo 39. Chute foundation in vicinity of Sta. 33+60. Tile and gravel underdrains in lanes 2 and 3, rebar in lane 3. View southeast. Neg. No. 4644 11-2-66





HUMAN FACTORS

- Normalization of unusual conditions
- Acceptance of past claims
- Overconfidence and complacency
- Poor decisions made during crisis



<https://wizardofads.org/trust-but-verify-why-you-should-take-ronald-reagans-advice/>


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<https://blog.prototypr.io/winning-the-telephone-game-5bf5457e16b4>

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- Failure Inevitable
- Yet Unexpected



INSIGHTS AND IMPROVEMENTS

- IFTR Lessons Learned

- Top-down safety culture for owners
- More frequent inspection insufficient
- Deep dive reviews into historical documents
- Appurtenant structures must be considered
- PFMA has limitations for complex systems
- Regulatory compliance is not sufficient alone

- Policy and Regulatory Changes Post Incident

- Oversight shortcomings
- Changes to process
 - Comprehensive and periodic assessments
 - Move to risk-based assessments
 - Role of independent consultants with dedicated specialties

Current Status of Oroville Dam

- Responsible ongoing dam safety efforts
- Community engagement and transparency initiatives

Although the practice of dam safety has certainly improved since the 1970s, the fact that this incident happened to the owner of the tallest dam in the United States, under regulation of a federal agency, with repeated evaluation by reputable outside consultants, in a state with a leading dam safety regulatory program, is a wake-up call for everyone involved in dam safety. Challenging current assumptions on what constitutes “best practice” in our industry is overdue.

**2018 Independent Forensic Team Report (IFTR)
Summary Conclusion**

TURNING LESSONS INTO ACTION

- Training and Preparedness
 - Emergency Action Planning
- Role of Emergency Management Agencies
- Technological Innovations for Monitoring



REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION


- Repair and Reconstruction Efforts
 - May 19, 2017: Service spillway closed for season, repairs begin
 - Design-build for efficiency
- Phased Construction: Two Main Seasons
 - 2017 Construction Season (Temporary Emergency Repairs)
 - Focus: Stabilize both spillways before 2018 rainy season
 - 2018 Construction Season (Final Reconstruction Started)
 - Main Spillway: entire chute reconstructed
 - Emergency Spillway: RCC apron to prevent erosion
- 2020 Completion: Ahead of schedule
 - Final Cost: \$1.1 Billion
 - \$400 Million under budget
 - National engineering awards
- Outcome
 - Spillways more robust and resilient, built to modern safety standards
 - Industry-wide reevaluation of spillway safety and dam inspection protocols

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REPAIRING THE OROVILLE DAM

The damaged main and emergency spillways at the dam will be repaired over two years. Here's an overview of the repair plans:

Feb. 27 — 20 days after initial damage appear on main spillway



Emergency spillway
The existing structure will be reinforced with a new buttress, splashpad and retaining wall.



Main spillway

Reconstruction of the 3,000 ft. gated, flood-control spillway is divided into five parts:

Top of dam

730 ft.

Existing spillway is being repaired and reinforced. It will be replaced entirely next year.

870 ft.

This new portion of spillway is made of structural concrete and will be completed this year.

1,050 ft.

Roller-compacted concrete is being used for this portion. A finishing layer of structural concrete will be added next year.

350 ft.

New spillway of structural concrete made this year

River

Energy dissipaters
Existing structures will be hydro-blasted and resurfaced next year



REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION



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
REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION

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TECHNOLOGIES & TECHNIQUES

- Advanced Technologies
 - LiDAR & Sonar
- State-of-the-art modeling techniques
 - 1:50 scale model at Utah State University
 - Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)
 - Building Information Modeling (BIM)



TECHNOLOGIES & TECHNIQUES



- Rapid large-scale placement methods
- Concrete technologies
 - RCC and conventional concrete
- Techniques for expedited construction
- Challenges and solutions



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FAILURE MODE MITIGATION

- Stopping progression of failure modes
 - Main spillway
 - Thicker and more reinforced slab
 - Offset surface joints
 - Better drainage & waterstops
 - Solid foundation and anchorage
 - Emergency spillway
 - Buttress and structural concrete cap
 - RCC splashpad
 - Secant pile wall





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CONCRETE REPAIR
Restore | Repurpose | Renew

PROJECT COMPLETION




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CONCLUSION

- Key Lessons
 - Think proactively: quality and maintenance matter
 - Longevity requires ongoing assessment and adaptation
 - Trust but verify: do due diligence
 - Be aware of normalization of deviations
 - Value of risk assessment for prioritization
 - Effectiveness of emergency preparedness
 - Learn from past failures: course correction
- Concrete Repair Industry
 - Cost-effective and sustainable solutions for aging structures



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qLlgqmg6pxk>



REFERENCES

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- California Department of Water Resources. Public files and resources. www.water.ca.gov
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- Los Angeles Times (2014). *Lake Oroville Timeline*. www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-oroville-flooding/
- American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). *2025 Infrastructure Report Card*. <https://infrastructurereportcard.org/>
- P+Ex: Center of Excellence for Preservation and Service Life (2025). www.pexcoe.org
- Photography
 - Most photographs provided from [California Department of Water Resources](http://www.water.ca.gov) public resources.
 - Links from online sources provided below photos
 - [Practical Engineering Channel](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjxNM4DGBRMU)
 - [MAPEI Corporation](http://www.mapei.com)
 - Personal photos



ANY QUESTIONS?



THANK YOU!

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SESSION EVALUATION

Resources

Evaluate this Session



To complete the session evaluation, open the ICRI Convention App.

Under **Plan Your Event**, select Schedule, and then the Technical Session you are attending. Select the sub-session you are attending, scroll down to Resources, and select Evaluate this Session.

AGING INFRASTRUCTURE

The 2025 Report Card for America's Infrastructure



<https://infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Grades -One-Sheet-2025 -Natl-IRC.pdf>

2025 Report Card for America's Infrastructure



America's Cumulative Infrastructure Grade

C

A EXCEPTIONAL
B GOOD
C MEDIOCRE
D POOR
F FAILING

https://img.lightwaveonline.com/files/base/ebm/lw/image/2025/03/67e30df0c286064db671dd0a_-screenshot_189.png?auto=format,compress&fit=max&q=45

AGING INFRASTRUCTURE


Cumulative Investment Needs

BY INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY BASED ON MAINTAINING
CURRENT FEDERAL INVESTMENT LEVELS ALL VALUES IN BILLIONS

Infrastructure System	Needs ¹	Funded, 2024-33 ²	Funding Gap, 2024-33
Aviation ³	\$310	\$197	\$113
Bridges ⁴	\$538	\$165	\$373
Broadband ⁵	\$61	\$61	\$0
Dams ⁶	\$185	\$20	\$166
Drinking Water ⁷	\$670	\$361	\$309
Energy ⁸	\$1,886	\$1,308	\$578
Hazardous & Solid Waste ⁹	\$162	\$146	\$16
Inland Waterways & Ports ¹⁰	\$45	\$32	\$13
Levees ¹¹	\$97	\$7	\$91
Public Parks ¹²	\$106	\$62	\$44
Rail ¹³	\$145	\$113	\$32
Roads ¹⁴	\$2,233	\$1,549	\$684
Schools ¹⁵	\$1,100	\$671	\$429
Transit ¹⁶	\$618	\$466	\$152
Wastewater + Stormwater ¹⁷	\$983	\$293	\$690
TOTAL	\$9,139	\$5,450	\$3,689


OUR ROLE & BENEFITS OF REPAIR

- Service Life Extension of Existing Infrastructure
 - Economic Savings
 - Historic Preservation & Societal Value
 - Environmental Impact
 - Reducing Waste & Resource Consumption (Sand, Water, Raw Materials)
 - Carbon savings



KEY:  Existing Structure Strategies  New Structure Strategies

SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION IS THE FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINABILITY



USA produces
400 MILLION
cubic yards of concrete per year
(2.3% of global production)

12 BILLION
cubic yards of concrete in service in USA (~2.4 Billion ton CO2 footprint)

Extending the service life of the existing concrete inventory by one day prevents **6.6 MILLION** tons of CO2 emissions (net decarbonization).

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